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ABSTRACT

Arguing that understanding human interaction requires both a study of symbol use and a study of human action, this paper focuses on one function served by symbolization--fantasizing. Drawing upon the work of R. F. Bales, who identified the sharing of group fantasies as a useful communication function and who observed the process by which group members "chain out" on stories that are only indirectly related to a task at hand in order to build a sense of group unity, the paper first offers a brief description of why some fantasies chain out and others do not. It then provides clarification of and definitions for the terminology employed throughout the paper, specifically elaborating upon "fantasy," "richness of fantasy" (the idea that some people have greater ability to fantasize than others), and "chaining out of fantasy." The paper then discusses a pilot study designed to test the "richness of fantasy" hypothesis. The paper concludes with a theoretical explanation for the processes of making meaning, persuasion, and problem solving--that the receiver is the source of meaning in communication and that richness of fantasy is a mediating variable in an individual's process of communication. An appendix contains the 10 richness of fantasy items used on the pilot study instrument, and four pages of references are attached. (FL)

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Receiver as Source: Richness of Fantasy

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Abstract

This paper presents a theoretical explanation for the intrapersonal communication processes of making meaning, persuasion, and problem solving. The notion that the receiver is source or locus of meaning in the communication process is related to an issue of growing interest--successful fantasy evocation. Richness of fantasy (RoF) is proposed as a variable by which receivers create their own messages in response to external stimuli. A synthesis of extant theory and literature is provided as the basis for the theory that the receiver is the source of meaning in the communication process and the results of a pilot study demonstrate that RoF is a mediating variable in an individual's communication processes.

Receiver as Source: Richness of Fantasy

Understanding human interaction requires both a study of symbol use and a study of human action. One way to attempt such an understanding is by asking the question, what functions does symbolization serve? The answer is several but the focus of this paper is on only one which is little studied--fantasizing (Klinger, 1981). Fantasy allows exploration without action, feelings without experience, and prediction without attempt. Fantasy allows vicarious experience.

Research into the processes of fantasizing and into the fantasizing itself have, in the past, often been regarded as a general waste of time. Only in the past thirty or forty years have scholars begun to change that general bias. Specifically, Bales (1970) identified the sharing of group fantasies as a useful communicative function. He described the process of sharing dramatizing messages as one in which groups develop a sense of their own mission and identity. Group members "chain out" on stories that are only indirectly related to their task at hand and, in the process, begin to develop a sense of we-ness or groupness.

Bormann (1972) elaborated on the observations made by Bales and argued for an extrapolation of the fantasy theme analysis method to other communication contexts. After over ten years of fruitful investigations, Bormann (1982) asked the

question that may guide efforts for the next ten years--"why do some dramas chain out and not others? (p 291)." That question provides the general direction for this paper.

I shall begin this paper with a very brief description of the explanations that have been provided for why some fantasies chain out and others do not. I shall then explain the conceptualization that places the locus for successful chaining on intrapersonal processes. At that point I shall provide clarification of and definitions for the terminology employed in this paper; specifically, I shall elaborate on fantasy, richness of fantasy, and chaining out of a fantasy. Then I shall discuss the results of a pilot study that was designed to begin to test the richness of fantasy [ROF] hypothesis.

Why do some fantasies chain out and others remain unshared? Extant literature reveals four possible answers. First, the source of a fantasy theme may be rhetorically gifted and produce material more likely to result in a fantasy chain. Second, the fantasy content may itself serve as the catalyst for a successful chain which suggests that certain topics are more conducive to chains than others. Third, the receivers of the fantasy may be more or less sensitive to sharing a chain. Fourth, the situation may be "ripe" for fantasy which implies that all, some, or none of the prior three explanations may be correct.

In this paper I shall focus on the third possibility. A knowledge about the rhetorical sensitivity of individuals will

provide insight into the process by which fantasies are shared and into the other three possible causes of fantasy chaining. The question is, are some people more likely to chain out than others? If some people have a greater need or use for fantasy or if they are more comfortable testing the world using fantasy, the answer may be yes.

It is my hypothesis that the receiver may be viewed as an important variable when predicting what fantasies will and what fantasies will not chain out. There are three plausible models that explain why people might tend toward the sharing of a fantasy. Any or all of them may be valid to some extent. All three of them indicate that, at least at times, there are people more inclined toward the sharing of fantasy who may be considered rhetorically sensitive to fantasy.

First, the "empty-headed" model posits the hypothesis that some individuals are not capable of creating and/or sustaining enough of a fantasy life on their own so they are attracted to fantasy provided by other sources (McIlwraith and Schallow, 1983). In this model, the fantasy sharing is an end in and of itself.

Second, the "full-headed" model posits the hypothesis that some individuals find release from negative fantasy in fantasy participation (McIlwraith and Schallow, 1983). In this case, the individual has a need, generally the result of an excessive amount or obsessive level of fantasy, to participate in fantasy in order to cathart. (See, for

example, Wakshlag, Vial, and Tamborini, 1983.) Again, the process of sharing fantasy has become an end.

The third model, to be discussed in this paper, posits that some individuals have a greater richness of fantasy than others. In this case, an individual is more likely to involve him or herself with fantasy and to use fantasy as a catalyst for fixing meanings, problem solving, and decision making. Klinger (1971) explained that "the moment of creative insight occurs when an individual recognizes that an element embedded in one frame of reference belongs also to another frame of reference, its double membership thus revealing a relationship that can solve a problem (p 217)." Hoestler (1964) calls this reative use of fantasy, bisociation. In this process, an individual receives a stimulus that evokes a fa tasy regarding use of or involvement with the stimulus. An example would be to take a test drive in a new auto which the salesperson hopes will evoke fantasies of the pride and convenience of ownership. In this model, fantasy serves as a means and not as an end.

These three models provide the impetus for the notion that the receiver is the source of successful fantasy sharing which is the concern of this paper. The full- and empty-headed models have received some testing already and are not the concern of this paper. Rather, the focus here is to investigate the RoF model as a predictor of successful fantasy chains.

In general, fantasy is "the amount of detail and vividness in an individual's imagination, (and) the ability to fantasize with reference to a wide range of stimuli (Infante, 1975, p. 75)." Hovland, Janis, and Kelly (1953) first coined the term richness of fantasy in reference to the ability to anticipate rewards and punishments that result from some action. Anyone who has "difficulty in anticipating accurately the rewarding or punishing situations depicted" (p. 203-204) was thought to have a low RoF.

Investigators interested in the process of fantasy sharing have placed an emphasis on the, other than here-and-now, nature of the fantasy content. Bormann (1972) explained that the "'here-and-now,' a concept borrowed from sensitivity and encounter group practice, refers to what is immediately happening. . . ." (p. 397). Fantasy is any communication which references something other than the here-and-now.

In this paper, RoF will be defined as the ability and readiness to affectively and/or cognitively enter, perceive, and operate in the realm of the other than here-and-now as a result of stimulus material from the here-and-now. This definition combines the breadth of possible fantasy type implied by Bormann, with a focus on imagination and on the weighing of perceived consequences when solving a problem or making a decision. The remainder of this paper contains a review of the literature upon which the receiver as source

conceptualization is based and a description of the pilot study conducted in an attempt to better understand RoF.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

To best understand the evolution of a concept, it is helpful to search the literature for clues which, when taken separately, leave a great deal of uncertainty regarding direction and conclusions but which, when taken together, help to suggest the receiver as source conceptualization. This review is both selective and interpretive in that it is guided by hindsight rather than foresight.

For years, scholars and laypeople have sought to identify and describe the means of persuasion available in a given instance. Research, though at times sporadic, has tended to center around one of four different views of the person in relation to the processes of persuasion: A) The Passive Receiver; B) The Captive Receiver; C) The Captive Creator; and, D) The Receiver as Source. These viewpoints are convenient organizational tools and are not necessarily representative of mutually exclusive categories.

The Passive Receiver

The basic assumption of this viewpoint is that people are rational and will operate logically when provided appropriate proofs for a particular course of action. The source of any communication is a person other than the receiver; the source is the primary symbolizing agent in the process of persuasion. For example, research foci have been on types of supporting material, use of logical versus emotional appeals, and effects

of organization and source credibility. (See, for example, Hovland, Janis, and Kelly, 1953.) The large number of research efforts into each of these and other variables has yielded some interesting and, at times, useful results. However, there are many questions left unanswered by a perspective that views source as the primary symbolizing agent. These questions are suggested and better addressed by the other viewpoints.

The Captive Receiver

The basic assumption of this viewpoint is that people are constrained by personality traits and personal preferences when provided stimulus for a particular course of action. In 1959, Janis et al. released the results of research which suggested, among other things, that persuasibility is a personality trait. In other words, some people are generally more easy to persuade than others. As was the case with the passive receiver, the source of the communication--the primary symbolizing agent--is someone other than the receiver.

Though the original work has been called into question, the basic assumption of the captive receiver viewpoint remains; individuals operate under various constraints that make them more or less vulnerable to persuasion at different times and under differing circumstances. For example, theorists such as Maslow (1970) suggested that people are more easily persuaded when certain basic needs have not been met. Others, such as Katz (1960), suggested that attitudes serve various functions. If an attitude loses utility it is bound

to change. Festinger (1957) argued that either persuasion or adjustment is the necessary result of a state of dissonance. The point is that these and other theorists all viewed persuasion as ineluctable and potentially effective if properly couched and situated.

The Captive Creator

The basic assumption of this viewpoint is that people act independantly when provided persuasive stimuli. Though the persuadee is still a captive to the process in that, for one thing, it can be initiated without his/her consent, this viewpoint has shifted focus to the receiver as the primary symbolizing agent. In other words, the receiver is now persuading him or herself. Some of the research mentioned above carries over into this perspective quite nicely.

McGuire's Innoculation Theory (1964) is one example of how this viewpoint combines the captive nature of the previous viewpoints with the autonomy of intrapersonal symbol creation and manipulation. Innoculation theory maintains that, if a shortened version of an upcoming persuasive appeal is presented to a receiver, the receiver will develop a resistance to its persuasive impact in much the same way that the body can develop resistance to disease after inoculation. The receiver is captive to the inoculation and autonomous in the resistance creation.

Further examples of the same basic process are found in the research by Janis and others (see, for example, Janis and King, 1954; Janis and Gilmore, 1965) on the topics of

counter-attitudinal advocacy and role playing. In general, this research indicated greater persuasive effect is obtainable if the receiver creates the persuasive message or acts out a persuasive simulation even if that message or simulation is counter the receiver's original beliefs. The key here is that the receiver is the message creator but is still captive to the persuasion process.

All three of the above viewpoints provide valuable information for people interested in persuasion and the processes of problem solving. However, they fall short in their ability to explain all that is observed regarding how meaning is made and how attitudes and behaviors change. The fourth viewpoint, which is in the developmental stages, attempts to take from the previous three that which is useful and to explain that which is confusing by conceptualizing a somewhat different process altogether. The fourth perspective is not all-inclusive in its description of communicative or persuasive processes. Rather, it fills a void in the other theoretical perspectives.

The Receiver as Source

The locus of focus for this view of persuasion/problem solving/meaning making is on the individual who selects stimuli and not on the source of a communication or message; the receiver is the source of meaning making and is therefore the primary symbolizing agent in any communicative context. This viewpoint combines a variety of ideas, data and theory to assume that: A) individual receivers are selective and

interpretive in stimulus selection and processing--they control the process; B) individual receivers will generate meaning and versions of reality according to egocentric concerns and their antecedent condition; and, C) individuals may "come public" with their messages and rhetorical visions in a dual effort to obtain confirmation thereof and converts thereto.

RoF is one important variable in the intrapersonal communication process as conceptualized in the Receiver as Source perspective. This section of the literature review contains a discussion regarding several indicators of the RoF construct and several bases of theoretical support for the model.

As mentioned earlier, work by Bormann and the Minnesota group (1972; 1982) provides much of the data for the claim that fantasy is shared. Bormann (1972) argued that fantasy sharing occurs when communication shifts from a here-and-now to an other than here-and-now context. This shift may be precipitated by some conscious or subconscious need of the communicators. The ensuing fantasy chain may help the individuals deal with their here-and-now.

The key, after identification of the process of sharing fantasies, was to determine whether or not the process could be rhetorically initiated. Bormann (1982) asked: "could skillful communicators design dramatizing messages with an eye to a target audience and deliver the messages in such a way that others were brought into participation in the fantasy?"

(1982, p. 281). ' His research indicated that some individuals are skilled in the rhetorical use of fantasy. "(P)ersuaders and publicists did on occasion make analyses of target audiences and then carefully plan interpretive fantasies to persuade them (1982, p. 294)."

Bormann's work provides a cornerstone for the receiver as source viewpoint and the RoF conceptualization but it falls short in its exploration of the receiver. Perhaps the reason is that Bormann makes a basic assumption regarding the origin and nature of fantasy sharing. He writes that "the communicative process of sharing group fantasies creates common beliefs and motives for the people involved (1982, p. 304)." This puts the focus of responsibility for successful chaining on the source and not the receiver. The argument in this paper is that if some people are rhetorically skilled spinners of fantasy it is reasonable to assume that some people are rhetorically sensitive to fantasy and thus might have a higher or more sensitive RoF.

While Bormann has focused on the origins and process of fantasy sharing, others have been coming at the issue from a different direction. As early as Plato and Aristotle, scholars were interested in an understanding of an individual's imaginal processes. In Aristotle's system "imagery consists of objects that had been perceived previously and then reactivated as a result of continuous physical activity (Klinger, 1971, p. 111)." Mead (1934, p. 257) also placed a focus on the individual when he argued that

drama will succeed because it identifies "characters which lie in men's minds. . . ." The locus of focus is on the receiver, and more, on the reality already in existence in a receiver's schema.

Schwartz (1973) described what Larson (1982) called the Evoked Recall Model to explain how persuasion occurs in advertising. Though Schwartz limits his focus to advertising, his work provides the other cornerstone for the "receiver as source" conceptualization and the RoF model. Schwartz argued that the key to persuasion is "not to try to 'get messages across' to auditors, but instead. . .to 'get messages out of' auditors by striking responsive chords (p. 537)." The focus is obviously on the receiver not on the source or process of message passing. The fundamental assumption is that the

. . .listener or viewer brings far more information to the communication event than a communicator can put into his program, commercial, or message. The communicator's problem, then, is not to get stimuli across, or even to package his stimuli so they can be understood and absorbed. Rather, he must deeply understand the kinds of information and experiences stored in his audience, the patterning of this information, and the interactive resonance process whereby stimuli evoke this stored information (p 25).

With a focus on resonance, the receiver is no longer captive but creator and the meaning of "communication is what a

listener or viewer gets out of his experience with the communicator's stimuli (p. 25)."

It is a fundamental conceptual change to focus on the receiver as source but Schwartz provides a good start. Unfortunately, his conceptualization is limited in two ways. First, where Bormann focused on fantasy to create reality to the partial exclusion of fantasy as a reflection of reality, Schwartz has focused on fantasy as a reflection to the almost total exclusion of creation. If the receiver can create messages based only on past knowledge and experience, the role of imagination and fantasy becomes unduly restricted. Bormann's work with a focus on the process of creating a common history is as much data for this claim as Schwartz's work would be data for the claim that Bormann does not focus enough on evoked fantasy. Second, Schwartz has limited his theory to the realm of electronically mediated messages because of the unique perceptual requirements for processing such material. There is good reason to assert that electronic mediation ought to be treated as different from, for example, small group communication and public address. However, the receiver as source theory argues that much of the phenomena described by Bormann and Schwartz are really part of a common set of characteristics and abilities that may be conceptualized as RoF.

There are several bases of theoretical support for the RoF model. Though these bases do not individually suggest the RoF model, taken as a whole they support it. The three most

pertinent areas of theoretical support are those which suggest varied levels of cognitive complexity, varied levels of imagining ability, and varied levels of empathic ability. Each of the three will be treated separately here.

Cognitive complexity refers to "the relative number of constructs in a person's interpersonal construct system (O'Keefe, Shepherd, and Streeter, 1982, p. 33)." The larger the number of constructs the more varied and rich the individual's interactions may be and the more options s/he will have to consider in developing a persuasive strategy. Cognitive complexity is thought to develop over time and with training (Pelias, 1982) and yet it is also thought to be relatively stable for any given person at any given time (O'Keefe, Shepherd, and Streeter, 1982).

"Cognitive complexity represents a continuum of information processing ability (Beatty and Payne, 1981)." As such, it seems to be similar to RoF as conceptualized in this paper. However, a review of the large number of efforts devoted to the understanding of cognitive complexity (See, for example, Delia et al., 1982; O'Keefe et al., 1982) reveals three examples of how constructivism does not provide a complete framework for RoF. First, "constructivisms primary concern has been to assess the impact of stable individual differences in construct system development on the acquisition and use of more adaptive repertoires of communication strategies and skills at managing social interaction (Applegate, 1982, p. 277)." As such, the focus has either

been solely on application of the theory to the passive persuasion paradigms as described above or primarily an application of the theory to interpersonal communication situations and always with a personality trait flavoring.

Relative level of cognitive complexity can be included as one part of a measure of RoF. In such an operationalization, cognitive complexity would be a measure of the breadth and depth of receiver response to stimuli. The potential for such an application becomes apparent in Berscheid's (1983) description of Mandler's theory of emotion. She wrote:

Mandler assumes that the extent of the meaning analysis to which a stimulus input will be subjected depends on: 1) the complexity of the individual's mental structure (e.g. the more complex an individual's mental cognitive structure is, the more implications a particular stimulus input will have. . .and thus the more complex the meaning analysis will be and the 'richer' the meaning of the stimulus to the individual) and 2) the state of the individual at the time of input. . .(e.g.) the more a stimulus has commanded our attention, the more quickly and thoroughly we will attempt to discover its meaning (p. 128).

Second, constructivism represents a much more active and controlling perspective to personality than is intended with the RoF conceptualization. Cognitive complexity is viewed as

an organizational tool in reference to an individual's view of reality (Delia, O'Keefe, and O'Keefe, 1982). RoF is a potential--a fallow, fertile field. It is one means of communicating and knowing and is more useful as such than as an organization for directed action or response.

Third, cognitive complexity is tied to the here-and-now. It is true that problem solving and strategies for persuasion are anticipated but the emphasis on fantasy as a means of understanding and meaning development seems contrary to the basic assumptions of the constructivist. There seems to be no reason why the three concerns expressed above necessarily make the constructivist perspective and the RoF conceptualization mutually-exclusive. Rather, it seems reasonable to try to extend the knowledge gained in cognitive complexity research to the RoF tool.

Work with imaginal processing provides a second base of theoretical support for RoF. The view here is that each person has a different level of imagining ability and will employ different types of imaginal processes (Singer and Antrobus, 1970).

The problem is that there are two types of fantasy; projective and free (Klinger, 1971). The emphasis of the imaginal process researchers has tended strongly toward free (Singer and Antrobus, 1972) which is non-stimulus created fantasy. Such a focus does not allow for an application of the theory to rhetorical concerns. RoF provides such an

application. Varied levels of imaginal processing ability are, like cognitive complexity, a partial measure of RoF.

In addition, the imaginal process perspective views fantasy as a process not a potential (Klinger, 1971). As such, the perspective is too much a focus on the psychology of the phenomenon and not enough on the practical and rhetorical applications which the RoF conceptualization would provide.

The third base of theoretical support comes from research in empathic ability which focuses on an interaction between communicators. This perspective has not been heavily researched and the research that has been conducted has focused on empathy as a tool rather than a theory. For the concerns of this paper, the former is a problem while the latter is refreshing and helpful.

There have typically been two basic positions taken regarding empathy. The first argues that empathy is a process of mimicry or modeling wherein the receiver empathizes with only that which can be imitated. The second argues that empathy is the process of projecting self into the message conditions of another (Horton, 1968). Either of the two positions is helpful in understanding RoF in that both place the locus of focus on the receiver who responds dynamically, creatively, and symbolically to perceived stimuli.

In the case of empathy research the locus seems to be on the receiver as source. However, there are two ways in which empathy theory is not one and the same with RoF. First, the content of empathic response is invariably affective. As a

result, large groupings of cognitive and conative stimuli and response types are ignored by empathy researchers. Again, as was the case with the two above theoretical supports for RoF, empathic ability can be viewed as a partial measure of RoF.

Second, empathy by definition is either modeling or projection and not creation. RoF, on the other hand, is an ability to create some new fantasy, complete or extend some old fantasy, or participate in the chain of fantasy initiated by someone else.

In summary, all of the material mentioned in this review is helpful in suggesting parameters for the RoF conceptualization. It is important to remember that none of this previous research should be discarded based on the discussion in this paper. Rather, this author agrees with Delia et al. (1982, p. 167) that "research ought to be conducted so as to extend the scope and precision of substantive theoretical viewpoints" and that research should "involve the study of the same phenomenon under diverse conditions and with methodological triangulation (1982, p. 181)." It is my opinion that RoF as conceptualized here will provide such an expansion.

This concludes my explanation of the receiver as source conceptualization and of the RoF model. Of course, any new theory requires testing and, in the next few paragraphs I shall briefly describe the first step that has been taken at the beginning of this research project. The pilot study I shall now describe is by no means anything other than a very

basic beginning to a much larger set of research efforts that will be required to fully flesh out and test the ideas advanced in this paper.

PILOT STUDY

Fantasy as a catharsis [full-headed model] and/or escape [empty-headed model] are traditionally accepted views of the phenomenon known as fantasizing. Fantasy as a means of knowing and interpreting the world is at once old and very new. RoF is a basic ingredient in any person's communication and operation systems. In light of this view, the following research questions were asked.

1) Does an individual's RoF have several sense mode dimensions which vary in use and importance to that individual?

2) Does overall RoF level vary across individuals?

The issues raised in this paper are not easily addressed. A pilot study was conducted to suggest the steps appropriate for future research efforts.

Methodology

Questionnaire:

An omnibus survey, one part of which contained RoF items, was conducted in Minneapolis and St Paul. The ten RoF items (see Appendix) were generated using a modification of previous survey questions proposed by Janis et al. (1959) and by Singer and Antrobus (1970). The items were designed to measure both general RoF levels and specific RoF sense modalities. Responses were collected using 5-point, bipolar

scales with points of Always True, Usually True, Sometimes True, Usually Not True and Never True.

Sampling Procedure:

The sampling frame for the Twin Cities area was provided by the two phone books for the area. The books were divided into five sections with forty subjects drawn from each using a random page, random column, random name selection procedure. Of the two hundred subjects selected, only seventy completed the survey. The low response rate was in part a result of the length of the omnibus--an average of 30 minutes was required to complete the telephone interview--and in part a result of the time constraints placed on the project. The age and education demographic data are displayed in Table 1;

$$\chi^2(4, N=70) = 5.02, p .05.$$

Insert Table 1 about here

Data Analysis:

The University of Minnesota's SPSS program was used to analyze the data. Analysis consisted of a basic computation of frequencies and a crosstabulation of gender by age across each item.

Results

The results are presented in Table 2. Of particular interest are the relatively high means for all but one of the variables--touch. This means that subjects thought that the RoF items (See Appendix) were sometimes to usually

acceptable indicators of their imaginal processes. The one variable, touch, that fell between sometimes true and sometimes not true was represented by an item that many subjects thought was poorly worded.

Insert Table 2 about here

The crosstabulation identified four variables--upset, happy, sound, and bad general--that were significantly related to age and level of education.

Discussion

Though the data collection and data analysis are not complete at this point, there are several tentative conclusions which may be appropriately drawn. The first research question, does an individual's RoF have several sense mode dimensions which vary in use and importance to that individual, should probably be answered with an affirmative. Indeed, two of the sense scenarios, smell and taste, were rated as usually true depictions of the subjects' imaginal processes. This is in contrast to a lower mean score for the sight and sound sense scenarios.

This result suggests some fascinating issues. Are sense modes typically thought to be the dominant ones for use in everyday life--sight and sound--less used in imaginal processing because the reality and immediacy of their form makes visualization of fantasy more difficult? On the other hand, are the smell and taste sense modes easier to utilize in

imaginal processing because of the less concrete imagery they suggest and are based on?

Advertisers and salespeople have long been concerned with the smell and taste imagery their products evoke. Automobile salespeople will spray a "new car scent" into used cars to simulate the new car experience in an apparently powerful way. These data suggest that the more powerful senses in day to day life are not necessarily the modes most suited to evoked receiver messages. They also suggest that people do have several dimensions of RoF which require further testing before conclusions can be drawn about how the modes interact across event and individual.

The second research question, does overall RoF level vary across individuals, should also receive affirmation. The results of this research confirm a significant three way interaction between gender, level of education and four of the variables studied. Three of these relationships--happy, sad, and bad general--center around feelings. The original RoF concept proposed by Hovland, et al. (1953) was generated in hopes of identifying a useful predictor for the effects of affective response to stimuli. This research indicates that such affective response is possible and likely in fantasy creation.

As a first step in the attempt to understand the receiver as source, this research provides some material to guide future efforts. First, the measure itself must be improved. Some research should be conducted to determine what

combination of current instruments would best produce the desired data. The free response approach of the constructivists, the Imaginal Process Inventory [IPI], and the measure used in this research should all be compared for their relative levels of validity and reliability.

Second, the differences between individuals and between preferred sense modes should receive further testing. Such research should begin by attempting a more concrete identification of the effects both gender and level of education appear to have on RoF level.

Third, the concept of RoF as a means by which people receive, process, and interact with stimuli should be investigated. Initially, the effect of RoF operation on the making meaning, problem solving, and persuasion processes would be of extreme interest. The questions of why some fantasies chain out and with what effect would be more easily addressed after such an effort has been made.

Appendix

RoF Items

| Variable: | Item: |
|--------------|---|
| General RoF | When I read an interesting story, I can imagine exactly how I would feel if the events in the story were happening to me. |
| Smell | Right now, I can imagine exactly what it smells like outside after a heavy rainstorm. |
| Upset | When I hear someone talking who sounds very upset, I can imagine exactly how I felt the last time I was upset. |
| Nice General | When somebody tells me about something really nice, I can imagine exactly what it would be like to have it. |
| Taste | When I see pictures of my favorite foods, I can imagine exactly what they taste like. |
| Sight | When I hear a friend describe a vacation, I can imagine exactly what the place would look like. |
| Touch | When I see a person walking on a sidewalk, I can imagine exactly how their feet feel. |
| Happy | When I hear someone talking who sounds happy, I can imagine exactly how I felt the last time I was happy. |

Sound

When I see a picture of a city filled with people, I can imagine exactly what it would sound like if I was in the picture.

Bad General

When somebody tells me about something bad that might happen to me, I can imagine exactly how I would feel if it did.

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Table 1

Crosstabulation of Subject Gender by Level of Education

| | <u>Age</u> | | | | | Row Total |
|-----------------|------------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-----------|
| | 18-25 | 26-35 | 36-45 | 46-55 | 56+ | |
| <u>Gender</u> | | | | | | |
| Male | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 22 |
| Female | 9 | 19 | 3 | 7 | 10 | 48 |
| Column Total | 14 | 24 | 8 | 10 | 14 | 70 |

Table 2

Relative Frequencies and Crosstabulations of Variables by Gender and Level
of Education

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | χ^2 |
|--------------|-------|-----------|--------------------------|
| General RoF | 3.652 | .682 | (3, N=69) = 4.80, p .05 |
| Smell | 4.0 | .993 | (4, N=70) = 2.85, p .05 |
| Upset | 3.657 | 1.034 | (5, N=70) = 17.52, p .05 |
| Nice General | 3.857 | .839 | (4, N=70) = 1.47, p .05 |
| Taste | 4.014 | .860 | (3, N=70) = 2.05, p .05 |
| Sight | 3.286 | .819 | (4, N=70) = 1.97, p .05 |
| Touch | 2.6 | 1.082 | (4, N=70) = 4.05, p .05 |
| Happy | 3.843 | .810 | (3, N=70) = 8.94, p .05 |
| Sound | 3.3 | 1.054 | (4, N=70) = .67, p .05 |
| Bad General | 3.429 | .986 | (4, N=70) = 15.47, p .05 |